North Korea needs to catch up with the South and Japan in terms of weapons technology and provides the lion's share of state resources for this service. Putin's re-election is the guarantor for a modified bilateral treaty (basic treaty) that intersects with North Korea's five-year plan, especially in the field of armaments.
With the inclusion of North Korean military equipment the formation of supply reserves of the Russian military is at full speed run. In terms of state ideology, the Russian war against the UKR has become a war of the DPRK against the NATO West. Pyongyang was able to test its weaponry developments under wartime conditions during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In many cases, Russian front-line commanders labeled them deficient.
Russia and North Korea reached an agreement (visit to Russia by DPRK Trade Minister Yoon Jeong-ho/윤정호) on the expansion of compensation transactions. A segment of Russia's services will be transferred to the program to improve the living and working conditions of North Koreans in order to restore the balance between war production and social reproduction.
So far, Kim Jo-jong/김여정's strategy of dividing Japan, South Korea and the United States has not worked. Kim's inner circle projects this own way of thinking onto the existing intentions of the United States concerning an unconditional dialogue with Pyongyang. Such a dialogue will be dictated even more closely than ever by Moscow's wishes. Large-scale maneuvers by the Western Alliance are expected. Political reactions to this from Pyongyang are getting less and less caught up in propaganda terms. Spectacular tests are expected in mid to late April 2024, and not just because of Kim Il Sung/김일성's birthday.
Current trade diplomatic activities of the North Koreans are to be evaluated from the point of view that the existing sanctions endanger the program's goals of military rearmament. There is a lively exchange on missing components between the RF, DPRK, IRN, CHN and the allies. This is reflected in the intensification of travel between Russian and North Korean delegations.
Assessments of the situation by the French Ministry of Defense attest to little change on the front line. The concentration of the Russian aggressor is geographically directed towards the east/northeast. In the assumed imminent offensive, Russian military are focusing targets in western Ukraine for maximum destruction. In the Russian Security Council in particular, there is a push for more favorable results by the military, with a view to a stable political situation, but, in terms of domestic policy, just as independent of the election result in the United States because of possible negotiations.
- Kremlin: Western partisan operations in the occupied territories to force Russia to the negotiating table - President Putin is now demanding all-round support from the FSB, which brought him to power in 1999 and which he made back into what the KGB was
- The FSB made Putin president, Putin made the FSB Russia's first service
Vladimir Putin, who in 1999 took over the leadership of the center of power as the FSB favorite after a tug-of-war of the KGB structures splintered by Yeltsin (with a subsequent war inside between the FSB, SVR, FAPSI, GRU, FSO, border guards), places all his hope in the Lubyanka.
President Yeltsin had not been consistent enough in removing the KGB from power. Wherever they Could, the GRU and FAPSI hindered Putin's rise in 1999 in the corruptly weakened Kremlin, staged by the FSB, with numerous skirmishes, but in vain. The FSB, the Kremlin and the Prosecutor General had kowtowed (detailed information provided by Swiss General Ernst Mühlemann after talks with today's Defense Minister Shoigu, then Minister of Civil Defense). [Foto zeigt den 2009 verstorbenen Schweizer Ex-Nationalrat Ernst Mühlemann, General der Schweizer Armee in "Schweizer Soldat" - die führende Militärzeitschrift der Schweiz, 2009]
During the Putin era, all key areas of the former KGB were transferred back to the FSB step by step (FPASI, border guard) and partially withdrawn from intelligence services that existed alongside it: for example, the FSB took over delicate areas of foreign intelligence SVR and the GRU. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs MID, too, the wishes of the domestic intelligence service FSB take priority over the foreign intelligence service SVR. A plan advocated by the then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov for the special position of the GRU in Western intelligence failed.
The West wants to force Russia to the negotiating table, once the occupied territories of the Eastern UKR have become a cancer for Russia's internal stability with a restriction of the Kremlin's radius of action through paramilitary warfare (destruction of economic entities, elimination of responsible persons, etc.).
President Putin does not think so, he explained it in his words. (See also explanations by Director W. Burns in Berlin, December 2021, on the development of a protracted partisan war after the occupation of the Eastern UKR by RUS)
- Will Russia export the partisan conflict from the Eastern UKR to Western Europe?
According to the current assessment of Russian authorities, the deployment of Ukrainian paramilitary formations and special groups behind the lines is causing significant delays in the Russian invasion cycle.
Vladimir Putin besuchte 2006 Dresden, wo er Mitte der 80iger Jahre bis zum Ende der DDR stationiert war. (Fotos/Text: Archiv der Administration des russischen Präsidenten)
President Vladimir Putin taking a walk around the city. Not far from the Frauenkirche, the President stopped by a café, where he drank a cup of coffee and looked through the local newspapers. While at the café, Mr Putin was approached by several local residents, construction workers, with whom he had a brief conversation.
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